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Farber: Richmond and Republicanism

RICHMOND AND REPUBLICANISM
Daniel A. Farber
Professor Michelman's Dunwody lecture, continues his study of the
conceptions of democracy underlying public law.2 As early as 1977, he
wrote about the relevance of republicanism to American public laws
something that did not become clear to most of us until far later.
In a series of works, he has examined how deliberative and strategic
conceptions of politics have played themselves out in judicial opinions. 4
The Dunwody lecture elaborates his analysis in two respects. He
further refines the analysis by distinguishing between two deliberative
conceptions of politics, liberal and republican. 5 He also applies the
analysis to a new set of cases, those dealing with voting rights.6

*Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. As always, I have benefitted
from discussions with my colleagues Phil Frickey and Suzanna Sherry.
1. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting
Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443 (1989) [hereinafter Michelman, Voting Rights].
2. Some of the other major works in this series are Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy
in American ConstitutionalArgument: The Case of PornographyRegulation, 56 TENN. L.
REv. 291 (1989) [hereinafter Michelman, Pornography];Michelman, Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Micheman, Traces]; Michelman, Laws
Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1591 (1988); Michelman, Possessionvs. Distributionin the Constitutional
Idea of Property,72 IOWA L. REV. 1319 (1987) [hereinafter Michelman, Possession v. Distribution].
3. See Michelman, PoliticalMarkets and Community Self Determination:Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 149-55, 177-99 (1977-78) [hereinafter Micheliman, PoliticalMarkets].
4. See Michelman, Pornography, supra note 2, at 291; Michelman, Voting Rights, supra
note 1, at 443; see also Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV.
29, 31-35, 84-85 (1985) (elaborating the deliberative conception of politics). But see Fitts, The
Vices of Virtue: A PoliticalPartyPerspectiveon Civic Virtue Reforms of the LegislativeProcess,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1988) (critiquing attempts to implement the deliberative conception).
See generally M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITIcAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5-7, 10-15, 145-48, 272-92, 314-18 (1988) (exploring other aspects of republicanism).
5. See Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 445-52. For the benefit of readers
unfamiliar with the area, political philosophers attach special meanings to the terms "liberal"
and "republican," which are quite unrelated to ordinary usage. See infra text accompanying
notes 54-58.
6. See Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 460-85. Although Professor Micheliman
attempts to trace the influence of the deliberative model of politics on past Supreme Court
decisions, he does not address how its explicit acceptance could affect the resolution of current
voting controversies. For an excellent recent effort along those lines, see Abrams, Raising
Politics Up: Minority PoliticalParticipationand Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 449, 475-81, 504-31 (1988).
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Rather than attempting to add to Professor Michelman's evocative
reading of the voting rights cases, this essay investigates the utility
of a similar reading of an important recent case, City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co. 7 Richmond sharply limited certain forms of affirmative action. s I contend that Justice O'Connor's opinion in Richmond
is best read as a deeply republican opinion centering on concerns about
political deliberation and civic community. Although the Richmond
opinion focuses on how republicanism limits affirmative action, I argue
that republicanism also provides intriguing arguments on behalf of
affirmative action.
Before turning to Richmond, two preliminary points must be addressed. First, definitions of liberalism and republicanism tend to be
hazy, and their relationship with any particular thinker is often unclear. 9 The difference between the two philosophies is to some extent
one of emphasis, with republicans emphasizing notions of political community and liberals tending to emphasize individualism.10 Both elements, however, may color the views of any particular political thinker.
Thus, the republican/liberal distinction should not be overdrawn.
Second, attempting connections between political theory and judicial opinions is a particularly hazardous venture. Judges are not political philosophers (nor, in my view, should they be). There is no reason
to think that Justice O'Connor has read the republicanism literature.
My thesis is not that she has developed a theory of republicanism,
but rather, that her Richmond opinion expresses a view of political
life much akin to that held by republicans. While I do not claim that
she had republican theory in mind when she wrote Richmond, I hope
to do more than torture a particular text until it yields a republican
interpretation. Rather, I believe that Justice O'Connor would find the
republicanism literature congenial and that a republican reading of
Richmond would strike her as sympathetic rather than perverse.

7.

109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).

8.

Richmond was seen as a major blow to affirmative action programs. See Jacoby, Now

We're on Our Own: The Supreme Court Cuts Back on Affirmative Action, NEWSWEEK, Feb.
6, 1989, at 64; Greenhouse, Court Bars a Plan Set Up to Provide Jobs to Minorities - Wide
Effects Seen, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
9. See Simon, The New Republicanism: Generosity of Spirit in Search of Something to
Say, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 83, 86, 92 (1987).
10. For general discussions of republicanism, see Michelman, Foreword, supra note 2, at
17-55; Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WMi.

& MARY L. REV. 57, 68-69 (1987); Sunstein, supra note 4. For a summary of the historical
scholarship on republicanism, see Sherry, The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution: A
Lawyers' Guide to ContemporaryHistoricalScholarship, 5 CONST. COIMENTARY 323 (1988).
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Richmond is a difficult case to parse, partly because the Court
was badly fractured, with three dissents, three concurring opinions,
and only a partial majority opinion.11 Before I attempt to explore its
relationship to republicanism, a brief review of the decision may be
helpful.
The City of Richmond adopted a contracting plan under which city
contractors were required to subcontract at least thirty percent of
their work to minority business enterprises.Y By a six-to-three margin,
the Court struck down the plan as a violation of the equal protection
clause. 13 Justice O'Connor wrote the lead opinion. 14 Fewer than five
Justices joined her opinion explicitly on some points, but a head count
reveals that all of her conclusions have majority support. 15
Richmond establishes three constitutional principles. First, the
states have less power to establish affirmative action programs than
the federal government, because section five of the fourteenth amendment gives Congress a unique role in enforcing civil rights. 16 The
federal government set-aside program for minority contractors, which
had been upheld in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 17 therefore was distinguish11. See Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 712.
12. Id. at 712-13.
13. Id. at 730 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion in which Rehnquist, C.J., and White and
Kennedy, JJ., joined); see also id. at 734 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
14. The Chief Justice and Justice White joined all of the O'Connor opinion; Justice Stevens
joined three sections of the opinion (I, III-B, and IV); and Justice Kennedy joined everything
except Part II of the opinion.
15. For this reason, like the Richmond dissenters, see Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 740 n.1
(Marshall, J., dissenting), I will not distinguish between those portions of the opinion joined by
a majority and those that were joined by only a plurality. Regarding those issues in which
Justice O'Connor lost her majority because Justices Scalia and Kennedy thought she was too
permissive toward affirmative action, see id. at 734-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); the plurality
plus the Richmond dissenters would constitute a majority for upholding any plan that met
Justice O'Connor's standards. The plurality plus Justices Scalia and Kennedy would be a majority
for rejecting any plan that failed her standards. Thus, Justice O'Connor's standards command
the support of shifting majorities, but majorities nonetheless.
16. Id. at 718-20 (distinguishing between federal and state power). Because the Richmond
dissenters would uphold a broad affirmative action plan by any level of government, id. at
754-57 (Marshall, J., dissenting), and the O'Connor plurality would uphold such broad plans only
at the federal level, the practical result is that the federal government's power in this area is
greater than that of the states.
17. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). For detailed discussions of Fullilove and other pre-Richmond
affirmative action decisions, see J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. NELSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw §§ 14.10, .23, 15.5 (3d ed. 1986); Choper, Continued Uncertaintyas to the Constitutionality
of Remedial Racial Classifications:Identifying the Pieces of the Puzzle, 72 IOwA L. REV. 255
(1987).
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able. Second, state affirmative action programs are subject to strict
judicial scrutiny like other racial classifications. 18 The government must
show that the program is necessary to serve a compelling state interest. 19 Third, a local government has compelling interests in remedying its own past discrimination and in ensuring that its funds are not
used to support or entrench private discrimination. 2° Local government
does not, however, have a compelling interest in remedying general
societal discrimination. 21 The Court feared that recognizing such a
broad interest as compelling would open the door to unrestricted racial
preferences. 22
Specifically, the Court found the Richmond program deficient in
several respects. First, the City of Richmond did not show that minority contractors in Richmond had suffered discrimination from the city
or local businesses. 2 The fact that a city with a fifty percent black
population had few minority contractors was not probative because
societal discrimination could be the cause.?4 Moreover, the city failed
to explain why it chose the thirty percent figure or why it defined
minorities to include Hispanics, Indians, and Eskimos. "The random
inclusion of racial groups that, as a practical matter, may never have
suffered from discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond,
suggests that perhaps the city's purpose was not in fact to remedy
past discrimination." 25 Finally, the city did not demonstrate the inadequacy of less intrusive methods of assisting minority businesses.2
Because the city considered all bids individually, it could consider7
discrimination on a case-by-case basis when it reviewed specific bids.
If general contractors discriminated against minority subcontractors,
the city should show that less intrusive remedies would not work;
only in the "extreme case" would a narrowly tailored racial preference
like the one Richmond adopted be necessary as a remedy. 28 Richmond's
plan was clearly not a narrowly tailored remedy: "Under Richmond's

18. See Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 720-23 (plurality opinion); id. at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment).
19. Id. at 727 (plurality opinion).
20. Id. at 720.
21. Id. at 722-23.
22. Id. at 727.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 724-25.
25. Id. at 728.
26. Id. at 728-29.
27. Id. at 728.
28. Id. at 729.
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scheme, a successful Black, Hispanic, or Oriental entrepreneur from
anywhere in the country enjoys an absolute preference over other
citizens based solely on their race. We think it obvious that such a
program is not narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of prior discrimination."'

The three concurring Justices all quarreled with some aspect of
the O'Connor opinion. Justice Scalia felt that O'Connor went too far
in authorizing affirmative action.2 0 He believed that the Constitution
mandates a general rule of color-blindness by state governments 31 and
apparently was prepared to allow exceptions only for emergencies
(such as prison riots), school busing, and similar situations. 2 Justice
Kennedy also voiced misgivings and confessed that he was attracted
to Scalia's more draconian approach.3 Justice Stevens thought that
Justice O'Connor gave short shrift to nonremedial justifications for
affirmative action, such as fostering diversity, though he admitted
that those justifications were not raised by the facts of Richmond.-1
Justice Marshall filed a vigorous dissent, joined by Justices Brennan
and Blackmun.- He took issue with the majority at virtually every
point. He saw no reason to apply a stricter test to state governments
than to the federal government; instead, he advocated the use of
"middle-tier scrutiny" for both.2 6 In his view, "[a] profound difference
separates governmental actions that themselves are racist, and governmental actions that seek to remedy the effects of prior racism or
to prevent neutral government activity from perpetuating the effects
of such racism. '' 37 Because of this difference, he argued against strict
scrutiny in affirmative action cases.3 He found ample evidence to
support a remedial program, based on statements made before the
Richmond City Council, the dearth of minority contractors in
Richmond, and the existence of widespread discrimination in the American contracting industry.3 9
The Court's ruling obviously disturbed the dissenters. Justice Marshall accused the majority of sounding "a full-scale retreat" from the

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 736 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
at 735-38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
at 734 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
at 730-31 & n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
at 739 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
at 743, 752 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
at 752 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
at 740-43, 747-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Court's long-standing commitment to equal opportunity. 4° He profoundly disagreed "with the cramped version of the Equal Protection
Clause which the majority offers today and with its applications of
that vision to Richmond, Virginia's, laudable set-aside plan. '' 41 In a
brief dissent, Justice Blackmun noted the historic irony that Richmond,
the capitol of the Confederacy, now stood accused of unduly favoring
racial minorities. 42
For purposes of this essay, Richmond is notable not so much for
its holding regarding affirmative action, but for the conception of democratic politics underlying the holding. It takes no great acuity to perceive the Richmond Court's views on legislative deliberation. Indeed,
Richmond is the clearest judicial application in the last ten years of
"due process of law making. '43 Justice O'Connor heavily emphasized
the weak evidence presented in the City Council hearings on the
set-aside plan, dedicating several pages of her opinion to this point. 4
After carefully reviewing the evidence, she noted that its weakness
was a fatal flaw in the city's case: "While the States and their subdivisions may take remedial evidence that their own spending patterns
are exacerbating a pattern of prior discrimination, they must identify
that discrimination, public or private, with some specificity before
they may use race-conscious relief. 45 Moreover, the inclusion of groups
the
such as Aleuts in the set-aside program "suggested that perhaps
'46
city's purpose was not in fact to remedy past discrimination.
In the closing paragraph of the opinion, Justice O'Connor drives
home the importance of deliberation:
Proper findings in this regard [by the city] are necessary
to define both the scope of the injury and the extent of the
remedy necessary to cure its effects. Such findings also serve
to assure all citizens that the deviation from the norm of

Id. at 757 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's previous brushes with this concept, see L.
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 17 (2d ed. 1988).
Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 723-28.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 728. The Court continued:
If a 30% set-aside was "narrowly tailored" to compensate black contractors for
past discrimination, one may legitimately ask why they are forced to share this

40.
41.
42.
43.
TRIBE,
44.
45.
46.

"remedial relief' with an Aleut citizen who moves to Richmond tomorrow? The
gross overinclusiveness of Richmond's racial preference strongly impugns the city's
claim of remedial motivation.

Id. (citations omitted).
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equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary
matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal of equality
itself. Absent such findings, there is a danger that a racial
of unthinking stereotypes
classification is merely the product
47
or a form of racial politics.
This paragraph could not fit Professor Michelman's deliberative model
better if he had written it himself.48
The Court is nearly as explicit in rejecting what Michelman calls
the strategic model of politics (at least in the setting of affirmative
action). The strategic model views politics as an arena in which groups
strive only to further the interests of their members, rather than the
public interest. As part of its assault on the Richmond plan, the Court
carefully marshals evidence tending to establish strategic motivation.
The statement of facts makes it clear that the particular minority
subcontractor involved in the case performed no useful services, was
probably unqualified, and was charging a seven percent markup just
for the use of his name. 49 Nevertheless, the city refused to give the
general contractor a waiver, even though no other minority subcontractors were available.5 The Court also stressed that the City Council
that passed the ordinance had a black majority, which could increase
the likelihood that the city acted without proper deliberation.51 Some
evidence suggested "more of a political than a remedial basis for the
racial preference. ' 5 2 The obvious implication is that the desire of black
representatives to further the interests of their black supporters is
not in itself a proper basis for a set-aside program. The final paragraph
of the opinion quotes approvingly from Justice Stevens' dissent in
Fullilove, which speaks openly of pork-barrel politics:
[I]f there is no duty to attempt either to measure the recovery by the wrong or to distribute that recovery within the
injured class in an evenhanded way, our history will
adequately support a legislative preference for almost any

47. Id. at 730.
48. Sunstein discusses the link between deliberative models of politics and judicial review
under the equal protection clause. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 69-72, 78 (noting that this
"Madisonian" approach to judicial review would support a more stringent rationality standard,
and thus legislatures would have to somehow justify disparate treatment beyond factional pressure).
49. Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 715-16.
50. Id. at 715.
51. Id. at 722.
52. Id. at 717 (quoting J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1359 (4th Cir.
1987)).
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ethnic, religious, or racial group with the political strength
to negotiate "a piece of the action" for its members. '
Because the Richmond Court stressed the importance of deliberation and a negative attitude toward strategic politics, the opinion
closely fits Professor Michelman's deliberative model. But Professor
Michelman introduces an additional level of complexity in his analysis
by distinguishing between liberal and republican deliberation. In a
break from the conventional view, he suggests that liberals also can
adopt the deliberative model.- Liberalism may be based either on a
desire to maximize the total social welfare (defined as the sum of
individual interests)5 or on a desire to protect prepolitical rights.r
By deliberating about how to maximize total welfare or about how to
protect individual rights, legislators could help achieve these liberal
goals more effectively.5r Republicans, on the other hand, give credence
to rights only as the outcome of political deliberation and believe that
"an autonomous public interest independent of the sum of individual
interests" exists.s Consequently, republicans place an intrinsic value
on deliberation. While the distinction is admittedly hazy, the essential
point is that republicans focus on the political community while liberals
focus on individuals.
Does Justice O'Connor's opinion in Richmond59 adopt a liberal or
republican conception of deliberation? Perhaps, as Michelman
suggests, the answer depends on whether "we imagine the justice
assigning constitutive value directly to the individuals's experience of
involvement in the dialogue, as opposed to regarding that involvement
as strictly instrumental to the individuals ulterior ends. '"6
Several features of Richmond suggest its republican orientation.
The Court views the city as properly concerned with discrimination
within its own city limits: it cannot rely on evidence of discrimination
elsewhere. The Court portrays the city as officious in attempting to
remedy discrimination in other localities. 6 1 Only discrimination by the

53. Id. at 730 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448, 539 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 733 n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that the
Richmond ordinance "might be nothing more than a form of patronage").
54. Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 445.

55.

Id.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
See id.
Id. (quoting Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism, supra note 10, at 67).
Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 712-30.
Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 485.
Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 723-24.
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city or by local construction firms could justify Richmond's ordinance.2
On the other hand, the federal government is properly concerned with
discrimination on a nationwide scale. The Court portrays combating
discrimination as a peculiarly national enterprise6 3 This focus on geographic boundaries seems unrelated to the strength of the remedial
interest in assisting victims of discrimination. But tied to the notion
of community, it makes considerably more sense.
The federal government represents the nation collectively. The city
represents the local community. The city's proper concern is with the
harms suffered by the members of that community.r 4 As Professor
Michelman says of another judicial opinion, the conception here seems
to be that of a city "defined by subjective membership rather than
objective interest in which the community's internal bonds are something more like civic friendship than procedural accountability. . ... 65
This republican conception of urban government underlies Justice
O'Connor's emphasis on the need to demonstrate a local basis for
remedial action.
The Court's preoccupation with the health of the political process
also indicates republicanism. Although the opinion does not lack references to individual rights, the Court's greater concern is with the risk
of "racial politics." Allowing the city to rely on broad concerns about
societal discrimination in drafting rules would provide no limit to affirmative action, making it - and political disputes about its scope a permanent feature of American life. 67 The availability of affirmative
action encourages minority group members to organize to obtain benefits. Whites then organize to keep their own share of government
benefits, thereby strengthening racial divisions in politics. 4 Unrestricted affirmative action, then, could "lead to a politics of racial
hostility." 9 As Professor Hazard has said:

62. Id. at 729.
63. See id. at 717-20.
64. Professor Michelman ties the idea of community self-determination to republicanism in
his earlier work. See Michelman, PoliticalMarkets, supra note 3, at 196-99.
65. Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 477-79 (referring to Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 61-75 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., majority opinion)).
66. See Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 721.
67. Id. at 727.
68. Unfortunately, racial polarization is not a hypothetical concern, but is already a widespread condition in American political life. See Abrams, supra note 6, at 494-504.
69. Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 721 (citations omitted).
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Preferential treatment for blacks therefore has to be predicated on grounds that are cognitively intelligible and normatively acceptable to the white majority. Some predicates
for such preferments are simply unacceptable. For example,
a community would find it unacceptable for blacks, having
established control of a local government where they are the
dominant majority, simply to vote themselves preferments
the way emergent ethnic groups often did in the past. If
such crude redress were condoned, the whites could do the
same thing where they had control, and we would soon regress to a legally segregated society. The same criticism
would apply to explicit "benign quotas" imposed by local
"rainbow coalitions" or narrowly based white elites having
control of strategic educational and employment resources 20
Racial politics is undesirable because racial animosity destroys civic
community. The Richmond Court recognized that strict scrutiny is
called for because "classifications based on race are potentially so
harmful to the entire body politic ....
The most direct sign of a republican focus, as defined by Professor
Michelman, is the Richmond Court's emphasis on the process values
of affirmative action. The Court portrays members of the white majority as having something beyond an interest in enjoying the economic
benefits that affirmative action programs divert to minority groups.
The white majority also has a noninstrumental interest in the process
(as opposed to the substance) of affirmative action. Courts scrutinize
affirmative action programs because, "[t]o whatever racial group these
citizens belong, their 'personal rights' to be treated with equal dignity
and respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole
criterion in an aspect of public decisionmaking."72 Moreover, the
Richmond Court chastised the city for failing to consider racial factors
on a case-by-case basis through its ordinary bidding process. Such
individualized affirmative action programs are "less problematic from
an equal protection standpoint because they treat all candidates individually .

. .

. "73 The legislature also reassures its citizens about the

benign purpose of the program by making proper findings. 74 Thus,
70. Hazard, PermissiveAffirmative Action for the Benefit of Blacks, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV.
379, 397.

71. Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 727 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448, 533-35 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 735 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (Richmond's ordinance may "cause the same corrosive animosities" as other
racial preferences).
72. Id. at 721 (plurality opinion).
73. Id. at 728-29.

74. Id. at 730.
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apart from ensuring socially desirable outcomes, the process of enacting and administering the affirmative action program has independent
value because it reflects the political community's respect for its members.
The major sign of liberalism in Richmond is the Court's emphasis
on the remedial purpose of the affirmative action program. The Court's
emphasis on remedying violations of rights may sound like rights-centered liberalism, but this resemblance may be misleading. At the federal level, the Court seems willing to be lax about the connection
between the alleged discrimination and the remedy. The Court also
apparently is willing to accept evidence falling short of full proof of a
violation when it evaluates state affirmative action programs.
Moreover, the Court uses republican language when it justifies remedial measures. The Court portrays minorities as suffering from a "system of racial exclusion 75 or a "closed business system." 76 "'Business
as usual,' should not mean business pursuant to the unthinking exclusion of certain members of our society from its rewards."' This focus
on exclusion comports with republicanism: from a republican perspective, excluding individuals from the civic bonds of the community is
a grave injury.
Applying Professor Michelman's classification scheme is not, at
least in hands less deft than his own, a very straightforward exercise.
Professor Michelman draws a subtle distinction between republican
and liberal deliberative models. His orientation toward the scholarship
of political philosophers is as foreign to the Court as is his vocabulary.
In some sense, this essay attempts to translate Justice O'Connor's
opinion into a language she does not speak. Such a translation can
never be exact. For these reasons, Justice O'Connor's views in
Richmond may not fit precisely within the republican tradition portrayed by Professor Michelman. Nevertheless, the most plausible reading of the opinion seems to follow Professor Michelman's republican
tradition. Apart from the republican elements in the Richmond opinion, the strongly republican cast of some of Justice O'Connor's earlier
opinions also supports the republican reading. Justice O'Connor expresses concern about the harm done to outsiders by exclusion from
the community in several of her opinions7 8

75. Id. at 720.
76. Id. at 729.
77. Id. at 730.
78. For a discussion of these republican elements in Justice O'Connor's opinions, see Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543,
592-613 (1986).
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As Richmond shows, republicanism can support politically conservative results distressing to left-of-center academics who have embraced republicanism. The discrepancy between the politics of
academic republicans and the results of this highly republican judicial
opinion is ironic, but it conveys no deep meaning about republicanism.
Justice O'Connor's republican leanings may have made her more favorable to affirmative action than she otherwise would have been, using
the concurring opinions by Scalia and Kennedy as a guide to the
nonrepublican conservative view.
Although republicanism raises concern about local affirmative action programs, it also suggests some distinctive rationales for affirmative action. My purpose in this essay is not to take a stand on affirmative action, but to understand the implications of republicanism for
affirmative action. I will sketch a republican perspective on affirmative
action, reserving the question of whether courts ultimately should
adopt this perspective. With this reservation in mind, I will explore
whether it might be helpful to characterize affirmative action, not as
a matter of rights (individual or group), but as a matter bearing on
the political health of the community.
The basis of the republican argument for affirmative action is the
importance of civic community. Because republicans perceive participation in the community as a basic element of human thriving, individuals suffer grave injury by being exiled or marginalized. Lack of
participation by some citizens also weakens the community by undermining the civic bonds that unify it. Lack of citizen participation additionally erodes the political process by converting a dialogue between
fellow citizens into an adversary confrontation. For this reason, the
law should avoid communicating messages of exclusion to any of the
community's members.
Justice O'Connor has propounded a similar theory to explain why
the state should not endorse religious symbols in establishment clause
cases. State endorsement of some religious symbols communicates
the message that the political community accepts some religious
group but simultaneously rejects other groups as outsiders with
deviant religious views.79 Justice O'Connor's establishment clause ar-

79. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Lynch, she

explained the impermissibility of government endorsement or opposition of religion as follows:
"Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message." Id. at 688.
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gument is perhaps even more profoundly republican than her
Richmond opinion.
A similar argument supports affirmative action. Members of racial
minorities have reason to feel like outsiders to American society. Compared to majority group members, they generally have lower incomes,
shorter life expectancies, less education, fewer jobs, and less political
power. Minorities also have reason to believe that prejudice and discrimination ultimately caused much of this situation. For liberals, the
accuracy of this perception is crucial because liberals believe society
is obligated to correct only the results of its own misdeeds ° From
the republican perspective, however, causation is less important.
Whatever the actual causes of minority disadvantage may be,
minority group members strongly believe the cause is racism. As a
result, minorities are deeply alienated from American social institutions. Majority group members may believe no invidious discrimination
exists and that remaining disparities are the result of other factors.
Minority group members are unpersuaded and will feel victimized and
excluded so long as they see whites in nearly exclusive possession of
desirable positions. 8 ' Words alone are unlikely to persuade minorities
that they are welcome members of the community. The majority community can persuade minorities that they are welcome in society only
by going out of its way to include them in key institutions 2
Affirmative action has some subsidiary republican justifications as
well. A basic element of republicanism is that only economically independent individuals truly can participate in the political dialogue; to
be economically dependent is to be politically handicapped.83 Affirmative action programs help minority group members attain positions of
economic security, thereby promoting their political participation.

80. For an attack on affirmative action on the causation issue, see T. SOWELL, CIVIL
RHETORIC OR REALITY? 42-48 (1984). See also Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 726 (suggesting

RIGITs:

that "[bjlacks may be disproportionately attracted to industries other than construction"); id.
at 728 ('"completely unrealistic' . . .that minorities will choose a particular trade in lockstep
proportion to their representation in the local population") (quoting Local 28 of Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part)).
81. For a fuller discussion of the marginalized position of racial minorities, see Karst,
Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & DAY
L. REV. 1 (1988).
82. This rationale for affirmative action has some similarity to Michelman's reading of
Harper,in which the right to vote is said to be valued as a "badge of inclusion in the political
dialogue." Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 484.
83. See Michelman, Possessionv. Distribution,supranote 2, at 1332-22; Michelman, Traces,
supra note 2, at 20.
84. The egalitarian aspects of republicanism are emphasized in M. TUSHNET, supra note
4, at 166-67, 288.
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Moreover, certain occupations, such as the legal profession, provide
special access to political institutions: If more black lawyers exist in
society, someday more black judges and legislators will also exist. The
government more readily will hear black voices as a result. Similarly,
black doctors will be able to participate in public health decisions,
bringing a minority voice into that setting. Professional prestige also
may give minority views a stronger effect in other settings.
Special republican arguments for affirmative action arise in the
context of education. Republicans place special emphasis on education
as a way of building community and inculcating civic virtue. 5 Assuring
that minority groups participate fully in educational programs has
particular importance to republicans. Moreover, including minority
group members as teachers and students also sends a strong message
to the majority about the nature of the community. s6 White students
who have black teachers learn in a vivid way that blacks are equal
citizens. Thus, affirmative action in educational institutions sends a
powerful message of inclusion.
The republican argument has some significant advantages over the
conventional argument for affirmative action, which asserts that whites
have harmed minority group members and therefore have a duty to
provide compensating advantages.Y This conventional argument is subject to two possible attacks. First, the causal link between past white
misconduct and present minority disability is debatable. Factual disputes exist as to whether the absence of minority group members from
certain occupations is due to past discrimination or some other factor
(Disputes even exist as to what past actions should be labeled discriminatory.) Second, the perpetrators of past injustices may not be the

85.

See Sherry, Book Review, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1229, 1235-46 (1988) (reviewing A.

GUTrMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION

(1987)).

86. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 313-15 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens wrote:
In the context of public education, it is quite obvious that a school board may
reasonably conclude that an integrated faculty will be able to provide benefits to
the student body that could not be provided by an all white, or nearly all white,
It is one thing for a white child to be taught by a white teacher that
faculty ....
color, like beauty, is only "skin deep"; it is far more convincing to experience that
truth on a day to day basis during the routine, ongoing learning process.

Id.
87. This argument is ably presented in Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 (1987) (defending
minority set-aside programs such as the ones upheld in Fullillove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448
(1980)). The literature on the constitutionality of affirmative action is voluminous. For summaries
of the major arguments, see J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 15, at § 14.10;
L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at § 16-22.
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individuals who bear the burden of affirmative action programs, and
the beneficiaries of today's programs may not have been the victims
of yesterday's injustices. At this point, the argument becomes tangled
in disputes about factual matters (Do all blacks suffer today as a result
of past discrimination? Have all whites benefited from discrimination?)
and in philosophical disagreements about group versus individual
rights. Objections to the conventional argument may not be decisive
but are at least troublesome.8
The republican argument avoids these disputes. From the republican perspective, the cause of present disadvantage of a minority group
is irrelevant, as is whether any particular white is responsible for
invading the rights of any particular minority person. What does matter is that minority group members have been excluded from full
participation in the community and feel sufficiently alienated to require
tangible assurances of acceptance. In other words, the republican argument focuses more on the present than the past. The conventional
argument is historically based. The republican argument thus avoids
potentially intractable disputes about historic causation and present
responsibility.
As Richmond makes clear, republicanism is not blind to the risks
associated with affirmative action programs. Such programs can represent political plums rather than principled republicanism. Affirmative action programs also can send a message of exclusion to majority
group members, who may feel victimized at the expense of both minority members (who benefit from the programs) and more privileged
whites (who are less likely to be affected by affirmative action). Ultimately, affirmative action may cement racial divisions within the community, rather than erode those divisions. The Richmond opinion responds to these concerns with careful scrutiny of local affirmative
action programs. The opinion leaves localities some power to engage
in affirmative action and gives the federal government broader
power69
Richmond is relevant to Professor Michelman's thesis in several
respects. First, the opinion explicitly reveals a deliberative conception
of democracy. After Richmond, few can argue that American constitutional discourse is based solely on a strategic conception of political

88.

For an argument in favor of future-oriented justifications for affirmative action, see

Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination:Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARv. L. REV.
78, 91-97 (1986).
89. A republican critique of Richmond might well argue that the Court overestimated these

risks or gave too little weight to countervailing benefits.
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interaction. Second, though not as indisputable, Richmond appears to
be based on a republican rather than liberal conception of political
deliberation, as Professor Michelman defines these categories. The
Richmond opinion therefore adds considerable weight to his thesis
regarding the existence of a republican strain in American public law.
Third, Richmond shows that republicanism is not guaranteed to lead
to its advocates' most congenial results. To that extent, the Richmond
decision may test advocates' commitment to republicanism. Finally,
Richmond suggests that republicanism may have something new and
interesting to tell us about the virtues and risks of affirmative action.
Professor Michelman has pioneered the revival of interest in republicanism in the law school world. Without his work, our reading of
the Richmond case would lose the dimension of richness provided by
the republicanism literature. He deserves credit for giving us a new
way to read Richmond and other major cases.
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